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The New Chinese Foreign Investment 
Law and Its Implication on Foreign 
Investors 
Meichen Liu  
Abstract: A major change in the regulation of foreign investment in China is un-
derway.  In 2015, the Ministry of Commerce issued the Draft Foreign Investment 
Law for public comment. If adopted, the new foreign investment law will replace 
the regulatory structure that has guided foreign investment in China for dec-
ades. The new law aims to further open the Chinese market and simplify the 
regulatory approval procedures for foreign investors. However, it will also limit 
foreign investment in restricted industries, which are still accessible to foreign 
investors through Varity Interest Entities under the current regulations. This 
note intends to examine the Draft Foreign Investment Law and analyze its im-
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In early 2015, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) released a 
draft of the new Foreign Investment Law (the “Draft Law”) for public 
comment.1 The Standing Committee has already adopted part of the Draft 
Law and implemented its “Negative List” system in October 2016.2 When 
fully adopted, the new Foreign Investment Law will replace the current reg-
ulatory regime. Foreign investors will enjoy “national treatment,” and will 
no longer be subject to a different regulatory regime from domestic Chinese 
investors, except in certain industrial sectors that are specified on a Nega-
tive List Catalogue, a list of industries that prohibit foreigners from invest-
ing or holding significant shares.3 The new Foreign Investment Law will 
also expand the scope of national security review of foreign investments 
and replace the current requirements for foreign investors and enterprises to 
obtain licenses, permits and approvals prior to establishment and significant 
transactions, such as shareholding changes, with a comprehensive “after the 
fact” reporting system.4 
China’s new Foreign Investment Law intends to facilitate foreign in-
vestments by creating a stable, transparent, and predictable investment envi-
ronment, but the Negative List approach and the national security review 
process will subject foreign investors to a more restrictive regulatory sys-
tem. It will essentially eliminate Varity Interest Entity (“VIE”), foreign in-
vestors’ current access to restricted investment industries. However, the 
lack of a clear legal definition and the regulatory overlay in the national se-
curity review process may undermine the legislative purpose of restraining 
access for foreign business interested in investing industries not open to 
foreign investment. 
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME AND THE USE OF 
VARITY INTEREST ENTITY 
The Current Catalogue Approach to Restrict Foreign Investment in Certain 
Industries 
China’s current foreign investment regulations subject foreign inves-
tors to a different regulatory regime than domestic Chinese investors.5 For-
                                                          
 1 Draft Foreign Investment Law Open for Comment Until February 17, PRAC. L. CHINA 
(Jan. 19, 2015), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ied185d55a08c11e498db8b 
09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=MyResearchHistoryItem&contextData=(oc
.Search). 
 2 Paul D. McKenzie, Xiaohu Ma, & Wei Zhang, China’s Draft Foreign Investment Law 
Still under Review, but “Negative List” System Comes into Effect Nationwide October 1, 
Morrison Foerster (Sept. 15, 2016), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/160915-china-
foreign-investment-law.pdf. 
 3 Draft Foreign Investment Law Open for Comment Until February 17, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Foreign investments into China are governed concurrently by Zhonghua Renmin 
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eigners, including citizens of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, must invest 
and operate in China through special investment vehicles referred to as For-
eign-Invested Enterprises (“FIEs”).6 There are restrictions on the business 
scope of FIEs, and they may only carry out activities that are permitted 
within their business scope, which is set out on their business license.7 A 
FIE’s business license is subject to approval when the company is estab-
lished and will face further approval if the FIE changes its business pur-
pose.8 FIEs’ business scope is regulated by the Catalogue for the Industrial 
Guidance of Foreign Investments, issued jointly by the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) and MOFCOM.9 
The Catalogue for the Industrial Guidance of Foreign Investments di-
vides all industries into four categories: encouraged, permitted, restricted, 
and prohibited.10 China encourages foreign investments in industries like 
manufactures and certain agricultural sectors,11 because they provide the 
country with technological inventions and capitals, and rewards such inves-
tors with certain government subsidies, tax incentives, and waivers.12 The 
                                                                                                                                       
Gongheguo Waizi Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国外资企业法) [the Wholly Foreign-owned En-
terprise Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Congress of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, effective Apr. 12, 1968) THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGR. OF CHINA 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/06/ontent 
_5004468.htm; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa 
(中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法) [the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 5th Nat’l People’s Cong., effec-
tive July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 15, 2001) MINISTRY OF COMMERCE (Jan. 14, 2003) 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100062855.shtml; 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa 
(中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法), Congress of the People’s Republic of China 
(全国人民代表大会) [the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 7th Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Apr. 
13, 1988, am’d Oct. 31, 2000) THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGR. OF CHINA (last visited Feb. 4, 
2017) http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-10/31/content_1481412.htm. 
 6 Edward Zezhou Xu, Yuan Gao & Ki Dat Cheng, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment 
Law: Overview, PRAC. L. CHINA, (Last visited Feb. 4, 2017). 
 7 Id.  
 8 Id. 
 9 See 2011 Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu (外商投资产业指导目录 2011 修订) 
[The Catalogue for the Industrial Guidance of Foreign Investments] (promulgated by Peo-
ple’s Republic Of China Ministry of Commerce, amended 2011) MINISTRY OF COMMERCE 
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/ 
201203/20120308027837.shtml; see also, 2015 Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu 
(外商投资产业指导目录) [ 2015 update of The Catalogue for the Industrial Guidance of 
Foreign Investments] (promulgated by People’s Republic Of China Ministry of Commerce, 
amended 2015) MINISTRY OF COMMERCE (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/201503/W020150402620481787669.pdf. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Gloria G. Liu, Foreign Investments in China: Basics and New Developments, CORP. L. 
CLIENT STRATEGIES IN ASIA: LEADING LAWYERS ON SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTING BUSINESS 
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permitted category includes every industries not named in the Catalogue.13 
The restricted category allows foreign investment into certain industries 
with restrictions. For example, the Chinese partners are required to hold the 
majority of shares.14 Finally, prohibited industries are not open to foreign 
investment.15 Notable industries include national defense, medical and 
pharmaceutical products, entertainment, internet and media business.16 For 
example, it is not possible for a foreign investor to directly investment in a 
Chinese e-commerce company such as Alibaba or JD.com, as they fall un-
der the prohibited industries.17  
Creation of Variety Interest Entities to Bypass Restrictions 
The current restrictive foreign investment regulations have a repressive 
effect on industries that are listed on the prohibited category. Chinese com-
panies in the prohibited industries have a hard time raising capital because 
they may be “unable to access capital from China’s state-owned banking 
system or from its undersized bond market.”18 As a result, they have to rely 
on foreign investors to finance their business operations. However, the Chi-
nese government restricts foreign investment in those sectors through for-
eign equity caps and complex licensing requirements, and requires most 
private Chinese companies to obtain permission to list overseas.19 To by-
pass these restrictions, Chinese companies use VIE to gain access to foreign 
capital. 
For foreign businesses that want to invest in industries that are in the 
prohibited categories, they can set up a FIE in an encouraged or permitted 
category and appoint Chinese passport holders to act as nominee sharehold-
ers.20 Setting up a VIE can be very complicated and risky. VIEs normally 
are comprised of at least three entities: an offshore holding company that is 
listed on a foreign exchange market, a Wholly Foreign-Owned Entity 
(“WFOE”) in China, and an operating business entity domiciled in People’s 
                                                                                                                                       
IN ASIAN MARKETS AND LEARNING THE LAWS OF LOCAL JURISDICTIONS, 5 (2014). 
 13 The Catalogue for the Industrial Guidance of Foreign Investments, supra note 9. 
 14 Gloria G. Liu, supra note 12. 
 15 The Catalogue for the Industrial Guidance of Foreign Investments, supra note 9. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Gloria G. Liu, supra note 12, at 6. 
 18 Kevin Rosier, The Risks of China’s Internet Companies on U.S. Stock Exchanges, 
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION STAFF REP., 2 (Sept. 12, 2014), 
http://www.uscc.gov/Research/risks-china’s-internet-companies-us-stock- 
exchanges-addendum-added-september-12-2014; Joy Shaw, China VIE Structure May Hold 
Hidden Risks, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0a1e4d78-0bf6-11e1-
9310-00144feabdc0.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4QsGWAJno; 
Rachel Lu, A Wrinkle to Those Hot Chinese Tech IPOs, CHINAFILE (Mar. 22, 2014), 
http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/media/wrinkle-those-hot-chinese-tech-ipos. 
 19 Kevin Rosier, supra note 18, at 2-3. 
 20 Gloria G. Liu, supra note 12, at 5-6. 
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Republic of China.21 Foreign investors can then purchase shares of the off-
shore holding company, which is usually based in an offshore tax haven 
such as the Cayman Islands.22 The offshore holding company can wholly 
own the PRC-domiciled WFOE.23 The Chinese shareholders can then estab-
lish a domestic company in the prohibited category, known as the VIE.24 
The VIE, as controlled by Chinese nationals, are legally permitted to invest 
in any prohibited industries.25 The VIE will then enter into various control 
contracts with its affiliated companies, which give all or part of its profits to 
the foreign invested company in the form of management or consulting 
fees.26 The foreign invested company can exercise control over the VIE 
“through voting proxy, equity pledge, and various other arrangements with 
the nominee shareholders.”27  The contractual agreements allow foreign in-
vestors to exert influence over the operation the VIE, but do not give for-
eign investors and their offshore companies actual equity ownership in the 
VIE.28 The operating control remains within the PRC-domiciled company, 
the WFOE, which complies with Chinese laws, while foreign investors de-
rive economic benefits solely from the contractual agreements.29 
Through the VIE structure, Chinese e-commerce companies are able to 
raise capital overseas. When the Chinese companies and their foreign inves-
tors want to list the companies on an international stock exchange, they can 
consolidate the financial statements of the VIE into the offshore group, 
which has control over the VIE, and list the foreign holding company on an 
international stock exchange.30 The most prominent examples are Chinese 
internet and media companies that successfully launched initial public of-
ferings (IPOs) on U.S. exchanges.31  For example, Alibaba, China’s leading 
e-commerce website, filed for an IPO in May 2015, which was one of the 
largest in U.S history.32 One of the largest Chinese retailing websites, 
                                                          
 21 Kaitlyn Johnson, Variable Interest Entities: Alibaba’s Regulatory Work-Around to 
China’s Foreign Investment Restrictions, 12 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 249, 253 (2015). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Gloria G. Liu, supra note 12, at 5. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id. at 5-6.  
 28 See Kaitlyn Johnson, supra note 21, at 254-56 (Alibaba’s example of how a VIE can 
list in U.S.). 
 29 Dan Harris, VIEs in China. The End Of A Flawed Strategy., CHINA L. BLOG (Oct. 10, 
2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/10/vies_in_china_the_end_of_a_flawed_ 
strategy.html. 
 30 Kaitlyn Johnson, supra note 21, at 253, 249-50. 
 31 See Rosier, supra note 18, at 2; see also, Richard Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIE’s, 
FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:39 AM),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/ 
18/looking-at-chinese-vies/. 
 32 Ryan Mac & Brian Solomon, Chinese E-commerce Giant Alibaba Files for IPO, 
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JD.com, launched its IPO in 2014 with an expected valuation of $20 bil-
lion.33 In the same year, the Chinese “Twitter,” with over 140 million users, 
launched its IPO on the NASDAQ.34 
Legal Risk of VIE for Foreign Investors 
The VIE structure is not without risk. Chinese law has been silent 
about the legality of VIEs since their creation.35 Chinese courts recognize 
that VIEs are an attempt to circumvent foreign investment regulations.36 
Like U.S. courts, Chinese courts are unlikely to enforce contracts that clear-
ly attempt to violate law and undermine public policy.37 In 2009, the Gen-
eral Administration of Press and Publication (now part of the State Admin-
istration of Press, Publication, Radio, Television, and Film) published a 
notice that specifically prohibited VIE structures in the online game sec-
tor.38 In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court of China ruled that contractual 
VIE agreements between a Hong Kong-based entity and mainland Chinese 
entity were intended to circumvent Chinese regulations and to use a lawful 
method to conceal illegal intentions.39 The Ministry of Commerce and the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission have also especially discouraged 
VIEs in the internet sector.40 Therefore, the effectiveness and enforceability 
of the VIE structure depends upon the good faith of the nominee sharehold-
ers from China. When the nominee shareholders decide not to honor their 
obligations under the contractual agreements, the whole VIE structure col-
lapses because there would be no legal remedy available to enforce these 
control contracts.41 One prominent case that illustrates the risk of the VIE 
structure is the dispute between Alibaba and Yahoo. Alibaba’s founder, act-
                                                                                                                                       
FORBES (May 6, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/05/06/ 
chinese-e-commerce-giant-alibaba-files-for-1-billion-ipo/. 
 33 Jonathan Browning & Leslie Picker, JD.com Said to Plan IPO by July with Over $20 
Billion Valuation, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.businessoffashion.com/ 
articles/news-analysis/jd-com-said-plan-ipo-july-20-billion-valuation. 
 34 Rosier, supra note 18, at 2. 
 35 David Schindelheim, Variable Interest Entity Structures in The People’s Republic of 
China: Is Uncertainty for Foreign Investors Part of China’s Economic Development Plan?, 
21 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L. 195, 209 (2012). 
 36 Id. at 217-18. 
 37 Samuel Farrell Ziegler, China’s Variable Interest Entity Problem: How Americans 
Have Illegally Invested Billions in China and How to Fix It, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 539, 
548-49 (2016). 
 38 Paul Gillis, Variable Interest Entities in China, ACCT. MATTERS (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie-2012septaccountingmatte.pdf. 
 39 Neil Gough, In China, Concern About a Chill on Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Jun. 2, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/in-china-concern-of-a-chill-on-
foreign-investments/?_r=0. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Liu, supra note 12, at 12.  
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ing as the nominee shareholders of Alibaba’s VIE Alipay, transferred 70% 
of Alipay’s interest to himself without notifying Yahoo!.42 Yahoo! eventu-
ally settled the disagreement with Alibaba.43  
The current foreign investment law restricts foreign investors’ access 
to some profitable Chinese industries. Foreign investors can circumvent the 
restrictions by employing VIE structures to invest in those industries. How-
ever, they face the risk of losing control when the enforceability of the VIE 
agreements is called into questions.  
II. THE NEW DRAFT LAW: KEY PROVISIONS 
INFLUENCING FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Draft Law Provisions that Expand Restriction over VIE-Like Investment 
Model 
Like its predecessor, the new Foreign Investment Law limits foreign 
investors’ ability to invest or operate business in sensitive industries. The 
Draft Law, however, when fully implemented, will explicitly eliminate the 
VIE structure. The Draft Law defines foreign investors to include non-
citizen individuals, any enterprise incorporated under foreign laws, any or-
gan of a foreign government, international institutions, and any domestic 
entity which is controlled by any of these.44 An additional standard for iden-
                                                          
 42 Kaitlyn Johnson, supra note 21, at 255. 
 43 Id. at 256. The decision to settle the case may be the result of previous unfavorable rul-
ings in Chinese courts. Shanghai’s arbitration board has invalidated two VIEs, id. at 262. 
See also, Gordon G. Chang, China Can Expropriate Alibaba’s Business—And It Just Might, 
FORBES (May 11, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/05/11/ 
china-can-expropriate-alibabas-business-and-it-just-might/ (mentioning a 2013 case where 
the Supreme People’s Court ruled that contractual agreements under consideration in the 
Chinachem case, similar in effect to VIE structures, were illegal). 
 44 Department of Treaty and Law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waiguo Touzifa Zaoan 
Zhengqiu Yijian Gao (中华人民共和国外国投资法草案征求意见稿) [Foreign Investment 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit opinions] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Commerce), MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jan 
1, 2015), http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201501/20150100871010.shtml (Art. 11:  
Foreign investor under this law means any of the following parties investing in 
China: 
(1) A natural person who is not a Chinese citizen; 
(2) An enterprise established in accordance with the law of any other country or 
territory; (3) The government of any other country or territory, or any department 
or organization under such government; or (4) An international organization. A 
domestic enterprise under the control of any of the foregoing parties is also regard-
ed as a foreign investor.). 
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tifying foreign investors is added to regulate indirectly foreign controlled 
business. The definition of control now includes: 1) directly or indirectly 
holding more than 50% of the shares, voting rights or similar equity inter-
ests of another entity, 2) directly or indirectly holding the power to appoint 
or nominate more than half of the members of the board of directors or oth-
er corporate governance body of another entity, or 3) directly or indirectly 
holding a voting right which can direct the decisions of the corporate gov-
ernance body of another entity.45   
This means that any domestic entity controlled by a foreign entity or 
individual—such as nominally independent domestic companies that are 
controlled contractually through VIE structure—will be classified as con-
trolled by a foreign investor and its investment will be subject to the foreign 
investment restrictions. This presents a material impediment for both for-
eign investors and Chinese businesses in the prohibited category. Industries 
appearing on the Negative List will be prohibited outright or subject to 
specified restrictions.   
The Draft Law also for the first time specifies the legal consequence of 
future VIEs, including: terminating business, mandatory disposal of shares 
or assets, confiscation of illegal gains, a fine of up to approximately USD 
140,000 or 10% of the investment amount, and imprisonment or criminal 
detention.46 
Effect of the Draft Law Over Foreign Investment 
The Draft Law may have a devastating effect on companies that rely 
on VIE structures. Foreign investors are likely to suffer economic loss be-
                                                          
 45 Id. at art. 18 (directing that: 
Control under this law means, in regards to an enterprise, a situation that conforms 
to one of the following conditions:  
(1) Directly or indirectly holding 50 percent or more of the shares, equity interests, 
property shares, voting rights or other similar rights and interests in that enterprise; 
(2) Directly or indirectly holding less than 50 percent of the shares, equity inter-
ests, property shares, voting rights or other similar rights and interests in such en-
terprise but fulfilling one of the following criteria: 1. Having the right to directly or 
indirectly appoint one half or more of the members of the board of directors or 
similar decision making organ of that enterprise; 2. Having the ability to ensure 
that the personnel nominated by it will obtain one-half or more of the seats on the 
board of directors or similar decision making organ of such enterprise; or 3. Pos-
sessing the voting rights to exert a substantial influence on the resolutions made by 
the shareholders meeting, shareholders assembly, board of directors  or similar de-
cision making organ; or Having the ability to exert a decisive influence over the 
operations, finance, human resources or technology, etc. of that enterprise by con-
tract, trust arrangement or other means.). 
 46 Id. at art. 144-45. 
03. LIU - NEW CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:54 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:285 (2018) 
294 
cause they may have to sell their shares in the WFOE. However, the only 
buyers that can continue to operate the VIE structure are Chinese nationals 
due to the expanded definition of foreign ownership in the Draft Law. In 
addition, once their control is diluted, foreign investors will lose control 
over the WFOE, and by extension its interest in VIE, essentially eliminating 
the need for such structure. On the other hand, the living space for smaller 
Chinese companies in prohibited industries may be reduced as a result of 
the change in policy because they can no longer gain access to foreign in-
vestment. In the past, smaller companies that failed in the domestic market 
had the option to sell to multinational corporations that were listed on an 
international stock exchange.47 For example, Eachnet.com was sold to 
eBay, JOYO.com was sold to Amazon, and eLong was sold to Expedia.48 
Once the draft law is adopted, foreign companies will have no incentive to 
enter into the Chinese market by setting up a VIE structure and operating 
through indirect control.  
The current VIE structures in the prohibited categories have two op-
tions to preserve their interests. The first option is to rely on the declaration 
system and to seek grandfather protection.49 If a foreign-invested enterprise 
controlled under an agreement applies to the foreign investment department 
of the State Council with information demonstrating its actual control of the 
Chinese investors, the agreement control structure may be retained and the 
relevant entities may continue to carry out business activities.50 Another op-
tion is to go through the declaration and accreditation system.51 The foreign 
                                                          
 47 You Yunting, Will China New Foreign Investment Law Wipe Out VIE Structure?, 
BRIDGE IP LAW COMMENTARY (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.chinaiplawyer.com/will-china-
new-foreign-investment-law-wipe-vie-structure/. 
 48 Id.; see Trefis Team, Expedia Sells Its Majority Stake in eLong and Enters Into An Al-
liance With Ctrip, FORBES (May 27, 2015),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/05/27/expedia-sells-its-majority-stake-
in-elong-and-enters-into-an-alliance-with-ctrip/#6ad346a57b5c. 
 49 Practical Law China, supra note 1. 
 50 Id.; see also, Department of Treaty and Law, supra note 44 at art. 153  
(Enterprises Existing Prior to Effectiveness allows a foreign invested enterprise 
that lawfully exists before this law becomes effective shall be governed by the 
provisions of this law, except where otherwise provided in this Chapter. In addi-
tion, Art. 155 allows a foreign invested enterprise that lawfully exists before this 
law becomes effective may continue to operate within such business scope and op-
erating term and under such other conditions as originally approved. However, be-
cause Article 153 only applies to business that “lawfully” exist, and VIE struc-
ture’s legality has been ambiguous, it is uncertain as whether VIEs can invoke the 
grandfather clause.).  
 51 Id. art. 51 requires foreign investors to submit application and updates regarding the 
operational scope of the business, such as organization form, governance structure, and 
whether the application involves the establishment of or change to the foreign invested en-
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investment enterprise controlled under the agreement shall apply to the 
competent foreign investment department under the State Council for con-
firmation that it is under the effective control of a Chinese investor.52 After 
the foreign investment department of the State Council determines that it is 
under the actual control of a Chinese investor, the agreement control struc-
ture may be retained and continue operating.53 As a result, foreign investors 
can proceed to the declaration stage after transferring a sufficient interest to 
their Chinese partners for effective control.54 
However, the reporting system implemented by the draft foreign in-
vestment law poses questions as to whether the grandfather protection is a 
viable option for existing VIEs in the long term. Article 92 requires foreign 
investors involved in the establishment of or change to a foreign invested 
enterprise to provide annual content report.55 The annual information report 
must contain information on the foreign investor such as name, domicile, 
jurisdiction of establishment, actual controller, organizational form, main 
business, contact person, and contact method of the business.56 Information 
on the investment such as investment amount, place of origin of investment, 
investment sector, investment region, investment time, investment methods, 
capital contribution ratio and methods, and information on whether relevant 
administrative license are also required are in the annual report.57 The annu-
al reporting system thus discourages change of ownership over short peri-
ods of time in order to collect profit as frequent change may trigger further 
review. Moreover, the reporting system further strengthens the supervision 
by requiring an annual report of portfolio investment, which mandates simi-
lar annual reporting for foreign investors who purchase less than ten percent 
of the shares in a publicly listed company in China, even if such a purchase 
does not result in a change of control of the publicly listed company.58 Last 
but not least, a quarterly reporting system is in place for foreign investment 
in a “key enterprise.”59 When a foreign invested enterprise controlled by a 
foreign investor has total assets, turnover or business revenue exceeding 
$15 million, or has more than 10 subsidiaries, the enterprise needs to report 
information on its business situation and its financial and accounting infor-
                                                                                                                                       
terprise. It also requires statement and declarations of the foreign investor and its actual con-
troller and their undertakings as to authenticity and completeness of the application materi-
als. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at art. 154-55. 
 54 Id. at art. 153-55. 
 55 Id. at art. 92. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at art. 93. 
 59 Id. at art. 94. 
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mation within 30 days of the end of every quarter.60 The combination of the 
reporting system and the prohibited list will become major impediments for 
the VIE structures and Chinese companies’ ability to seek foreign invest-
ment in sensitive industries such as the Internet, media, and energy. 
Despite the strengthened regulation and the clear ban on VIE under the 
Draft Foreign Investment Law, the Shanghai Free Trade Area may offer a 
last option for continuing the VIE arrangement. The Ministry of Industry 
circulated a document in 2015, stating that the Shanghai Free Trade Zone 
will allow foreign investors to hold up to a 100 percent equity ratio in 
online data processing and e-commerce businesses.61 As the Shanghai Free 
Trade Zone has served as a testing ground for commercial and investment 
reform, there is reason to believe that if implemented successfully, a similar 
rule can be adopted by free trade zones in other parts of China. In turn, for-
eign investors can request their Chinese partners to change where the enter-
prises are located and avoid a complete transfer of their interest. 
III. CHANGE FROM CATALOG APPROACH TO NEGATIVE 
LIST APPROACH 
The Draft Law presented a new idea that foreign investment will re-
ceive national treatment regulated in the same way as domestic invest-
ment.62 This means that foreign companies not on the prohibited list will be 
able to establish businesses by applying directly to the State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce. However, this change will be contingent on a 
“‘negative list’ of industrial sectors to which national treatment will not ap-
ply.”63 The Negative List approach will replace the existing catalogue sys-
tem and only retain two categories of industries: (i) the “prohibited” catego-
ry in which foreign investment is completely prohibited and (ii) the 
“restricted” category in which foreign investment will be subject to various 
restrictions.64 In prohibited industries, no foreign investment in any form 
will be allowed, neither through any VIE structure nor through any inter-
mediary domestic companies.65 
Foreign investments in restricted industries will require the investor to 
obtain an entry license.66 “The Negative List will specify the limitations and 
conditions that will apply to obtaining such a license for each industrial sec-
                                                          
 60 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44. 
 61 David Livdahl & Jenny Sheng, China Opens Up to Wholly Foreign-Owned E-
Commerce Cos, LAW360 (Jul. 14, 2016) https://www.law360.com/articles/817517/china-
opens-up-to-wholly-foreign-owned-e-commerce-cos. 
 62 Draft Foreign Investment Law Open for Comment Until February 17, supra note 1. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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tor.”67 Approval of market access will be required for any foreign invest-
ment in a restricted sector.68 Commentators also expect the Negative List to 
set out a monetary threshold over which investments would require market 
access approval, specific to industry sector.69 Once the Negative List is put 
in place, it will lift regulatory hurdles for a number of foreign investment 
projects for which foreign investment approval would no longer be neces-
sary.70 The introduction of the Negative List regime came into effect on Oc-
tober 1, 2016.71  
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS  
The Draft Foreign Investment Law also places a national security re-
view process over foreign investment in the restricted investment catego-
ry.72 China did not have a formal national security review regime until 
2011.73 Before 2011, there were certain scattered provisions in foreign in-
vestment-related regulations that would require security reviews.74 Howev-
er, despite the declaration that national security review should be conduct-
ed, no actual review process was conducted and no penalty was ever 
assessed.75 
The Draft Foreign Investment Law establishes an inter-ministerial 
committee to conduct national security review.76  The committee designates 
National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”), China’s eco-
nomic planning agency, and MOFCOM as standing lead agencies, with a 
number of other agencies acting as member agencies in the committee.77 
                                                          
 67 Id.  
 68 Draft Foreign Investment Law Open for Comment Until February 17, supra note 1. 
 69 Id. “The Draft Law expressly prohibits foreign investors from splitting a large invest-
ment into smaller ones to circumvent the approval requirement.” Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Paul D. McKenzie, Xiaohu Ma, & Wei Zhang, supra note 2([T]he Negative List will 
affect “core laws governing establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises and both Si-
no-foreign equity and Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures.”). 
 72 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, art. 26-27. 
 73 Xingxing Li, National Security Review in Foreign Investments: A Comparative and 
Critical Assessment On China and U.S. Laws and Practices, 13 BERK. BUS. L. J. 255, 265-66 
(2016). 
 74 Id. at 263-64 “For example, China’s M&A Rules of 2006, as amended in 2009, state 
that parties should make a filing to MOFCOM where a foreign investor acquires a domestic 
Chinese company, obtains de facto controlling power, and the acquisition (i) concerns criti-
cal sectors or (ii) impacts, or has the possibility of impacting, China’s national economic se-
curity.” Id.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, at art. 49. 
 77 Id. The development and reform department and the department in charge of foreign 
investment, both under the State Council, shall act as co-conveners of the Joint Committee 
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The Draft Foreign Investment Law has not specified the identities of mem-
ber agencies apart from the NDRC and MOFCOM.78 In the security review 
process, China’s pilot free trade zone’s review process may become a refer-
ence for the membership of the committee. The security review committee 
in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone consists of as many as thirty agencies, in-
cluding the Department of Justice, the Department of Finance, the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology that may participate in the review 
process.79 
The Problem in The Formulation of National Security Review System 
Makes Enforcement Inconsistent. 
National security review only applies to industries in restricted catego-
ry and the factors in evaluation process are not clearly defined in the Draft 
Law. As a result, the enforcement of the system will likely be subject to 
discretion from the security review committee.  
The policy rationale behind foreign investment is always a balance test 
between fending off foreign competition, to invoke it as a gatekeeper of 
foreign investments and to protect its national security.80 Due to the need of 
foreign capital to finance China’s growing market, China’s security review 
scope has been narrowly tailored to allow foreign investment transaction to 
be immune from security review.81 
Compared with its U.S. counterpart, the Committee on Foreign In-
vestment in the United States, Chinese policymakers adopted a categorical 
list in an effort to narrow down the factors to be considered in a national se-
curity review.82 In accordance with the categorical list, regulators may re-
view inward foreign investment transactions—not restricted to mergers and 
acquisitions—relevant to national defense, critical technology, critical in-
frastructure, energy, and other resources.83 The broad and ambiguous list is 
                                                                                                                                       
and conduct foreign investment national security review in conjunction with other depart-
ments related to foreign investment. 
 78 Id. at art. 49 (charging the State Council to establish an inter-ministerial joint commit-
tee for foreign investment national security review to bear responsibility for the foreign in-
vestment national security review). 
 79 See State Council, Approval Reply of the State Council Pertaining to the Establishment 
of the Working-Level Inter-Ministerial Joint-Committee System in Free Trade Zones That 
Were Set Up by the State Council 
(国务院关于同意建立国务院自由贸易试验区工作部际联席会议制度的批复), STATE 
COUNCIL (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-02/16/content_9486.htm. 
 80 Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 268-70.  
 81 Id. at 283. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. See also Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version 
to solicit opinions, supra note 44, at art. 57 (Factors to be Considered in connection with Na-
tional Security Review of a foreign investment include): 
(1) the influence on national defense security, including domestic product production capa-
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equivalent to the U.S. approach of not furnishing a definition of national se-
curity.84 While each categorical element is broad and ambiguous, the list is 
not a comprehensive one, missing the entire financial sector.85 It unreasona-
bly narrows the scope of the review and “mistakenly renders large subsets 
of transactions immune from national security scrutiny.”86 
The Chinese National Security Review System Has Under Inclusive 
Definitions of Key Provisions That Allow Foreign Investors to Bypass the 
Process. 
Chinese policymakers have very limited experience with national secu-
rity review and therefore directly borrow rules from more sophisticated ju-
risdictions like that of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States.87 However, the many rules and structural arrangements transplanted 
from that of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States re-
quire cost-benefit analysis, data collections, and empirical study backup, 
which are traditions lacking in China’s policymaking process.88 China uses 
a top-down implementation of the intention of the leadership rule-making 
process, rather than empiricism derived from experience or cost-benefit 
analysis.89   
                                                                                                                                       
bilities, domestic service provision capabilities, and related equipment and facilities, in each 
case required for national defense, and the influence on the security of important or sensitive 
national defense facilities; 
(2) the influence on the research and development capabilities for key technologies involving 
national security; 
(3) the influence on the primacy of China’s technologies in the national security sectors; 
(4) the influence on the spread of dual use products and technologies that are subject to im-
port or export control; 
(5) the influence on China’s key infrastructure and key technologies; 
(6) the influence on China’s information and internet security; 
(7) the influence on China’s long term demands for energy, grain and other key resources; 
(8) whether the foreign investment is controlled by a foreign government; 
(9) the influence on the stable operation of national economy; 
(10) the influence on the public interest and public order; and 
(11) other factors that the Joint Committee believes must be considered). 
 84 See Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 283. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 285. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Chinese Communist Party News (中国共产党新闻网), The Current State of Chi-
na’s Legislation, the Problems, and the Reasons Analyzed 
(我国立法的现状、问题与原因分析) 我国立法的现状 PEOPLE’S DAILY (Jul. 8, 2008), 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/68294/120979/124345/7481139.html (noting the lack of 
cost-benefit analysis in rule-makings, the absence of procedural due process, and the top-
down rule-making process in which the drafters merely carry out the superior’s will without 
scientific reasoning). See also Ta-kuang Chang, The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: 
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The lack of experience in national review is manifested in the arbitrary 
definition of “control” in the national security review system. The Commit-
tee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) has a broad defi-
nition of control, allowing the CFIUS to trigger the review process even 
when foreign investors only account for a small amount of shares, as no 
dollar threshold is set out for a covered transaction eligible for CFIUS.90 As 
a result, an investor must file a notice with CFIUS when a control is found, 
and foreign ownership of less than 10 percent in a U.S. business may con-
stitute foreign control unless it is solely for the purpose of passive invest-
ment with no elements of control.91  
In comparison, the definition of “control” in Chinese context is much 
narrower. China adopts a cutoff of 50% equity interests as its national secu-
rity review threshold: “control” is found where one or more foreign inves-
tors hold more than 50% interest in a target company.92 The 50% ownership 
threshold is documented in the rules promulgated by China’s State Council. 
However, the Catalogue system, which is primarily formulated by the 
NDRC, failed to reconcile the national security review threshold issued by 
the State Council.93 
The Draft Foreign Investment Law is completely silent on the defini-
tion of control in its National Security Review process; rather it focuses en-
tirely on the influence of foreign investment over restricted industries.94 
Therefore, one may need to fall back on the State Council National Security 
Review rule when looking for a definition of control.95 The 50% ownership 
threshold is arbitrary even though additional catchall provisions were pro-
vided to find control, which includes “(i) where a foreign investor’s equity 
interest is less than 50 percent, but equity interest voting rights exert sub-
stantial influences shareholders’ meetings or the board of directors, and (ii) 
                                                                                                                                       
A Study in the Chinese Legislative Process, 28 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 333, 336-54 (1987). See 
also Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, 141 CHINA Q, 1, 3-4 (1995). 
 90 See Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 290. CFIUS can review a “covered transaction”, as 
defined in 31 C.F.R. § 800.207 (2015), where a transaction is defined as “by or which any 
foreign person, which could result in control of U.S. business by a foreign person.” Control 
can be identified if a foreign investor (a) has the ability to determine or block important 
business matters, or (b) has representation on the board of directors. 50 U.S.C. app. § 
2170(a) does not give a dollar threshold to define control, and CFIUS interprets “control” far 
more broadly than traditional corporate governance concepts.  
 91 Id. at 290. 
 92 State Council, Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment 
of National Security Review Regime Pertaining to the Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Companies by Foreign Investors (国务院办公厅关于建立外国投资者 
并购境内企业安全审查制度的通知), GEN. OFFICE OF STATE COUNCIL (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-02/12/content_1802467.htm. 
 93 See Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 291. 
 94 See Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, at Art. 57. 
 95 See Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 291. 
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a de facto control transfer from the target company (i.e., management deci-
sions, finance, personnel, or technology) to foreign investors.”96 Even 
though the catchall provision, together with the 50% threshold, seems to 
cover foreign holding below 50 percent, the catchall provision does not 
touch on the ownership threshold for “control.”97 It is highly likely that the 
committee in its enforcement activities will rely on the 50% ownership 
threshold as its benchmark for national security review.98 
The security review system issued by State Council clearly aims to 
check against inward mergers and acquisitions activities.99 Yet the 50% 
threshold in reality functions to automatically filter out a subset of critical 
sectors, “those sectors in which foreign ownership is restricted to minority 
interest such as financial service and telecommunication, granting them 
immunity from national security review.”100 
Since the National Security Review under the new foreign investment 
law will likely refer back to the 50% ownership threshold set up by State 
Council,101 this potentially has a relaxing effect for foreign investment un-
der the new foreign investment law. When considering both the Catalogue 
system and the national security review regime together, the over-50% eq-
uity threshold renders industries that the Catalogue system imposes a cap on 
foreign shareholding off the radar of scrutiny for national security threats.102 
In addition, because foreign investors concurrently abide several layers of 
regulations, they have to file against the Catalogue system to fall into the 
reviewable category (comply with the shareholding limitations) and file a 
national security notice for investment in restricted sector.103 The collision 
between these two regimes leads to the ineffectiveness of a national security 
review in certain sectors, for example, “as long as a foreign investor com-
plies with the shareholding restrictions, the regulators do not have to assess 
the national security consequences of their investment.”104  
Competition Between Department and Local Governments Incentivize a 
Lessened Standard of Review. 
China’s National Security Review process is carried out by an inter-
ministerial joint committee chaired by both the NDRC and MOFCOM and 
                                                          
 96 Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of National 
Security Review Regime Pertaining to the Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Companies 
by Foreign Investors, supra note 92, at Art. 3(2), (3), and (4). 
 97 Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 291. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. at 292. 
 100 Id. at 291. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 292. 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.  
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includes other ministries in charge of the industries and sectors related to 
the proposed foreign acquisition, although the specific ministries involved 
are ambiguous.105 The review process has two phases. The general review 
phase, analogous to the initial review phase in the CFIUS process, will be 
completed within thirty working days.106
 
If there is no national security 
concern found, the transaction can go through, unless the committee detects 
concealed or false information during the report progress, thus reinitiating 
the investigation.107 Otherwise, the review enters the second phase, where a 
special investigation phase, analogous to the special investigation phase in 
the CFIUS process, is to be completed within sixty business days.108  
The Draft Law does not clarify the differences between the two phases. 
Factors to be considered in the national security review process, as listed in 
Article 57 of the draft law, seem to apply across the board for the entire re-
view proceeding.109 The language of Articles 51, 52 (general review phase) 
and Articles 61, 64 (special investigation phase) identify reviewers by phas-
es. For the general review process, the “department in charge of foreign in-
vestment under the State Council” (usually local government) will deter-
mine whether the application enter the general phase, and submit the 
application material to the Joint Committee for review.110 For the special 
investigation phase, the Joint Committee can make the decision to approve 
the transaction, or to submit the potential application to the State Council 
for final decision.111 Conveniently, before the conclusion of the special in-
vestigation, a foreign investor may propose mitigation measures to avoid 
being attributed as posing national security risk.112
 
The Joint Committee 
                                                          
 105 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, at art. 49. Joint Committee for National Security Review (The State 
Council shall establish an inter-ministerial joint committee for foreign investment national 
security review to bear responsibility for the foreign investment national security review. 
The development and reform department and the department in charge of foreign invest-
ment, both under the State Council, shall act as co-conveners of the Joint Committee and 
conduct foreign investment national security review in conjunction with other departments 
related to foreign investment). 
 106 Id. art. 61. The general review process starts within 15 business days after receiving 
the application materials prescribed in art. 51 (Application Materials for National Security 
Review). Then, art. 57, Factors to be Considered in connection with National Security Re-
view are evaluated to determine whether the second phase of review is required.  
 107 Id. at art. 62. The joint committee reserve the right to revisit the review under art. 56 
(Supplementary National Security Review). 
 108 Id. at art. 62. 
 109 Id. at art. 57 (listing the factors to be considered in connection with National Security 
Review). Because the use of phrase “National Security Review” correspond with general 
provisions National Security Review, it can be assumed that the factors are applied to both 
review processes. 
 110 Id. at art. 52-54. 
 111 Id. at art. 62-64. 
 112 Id. at art. 65 (“[t]o avoid having a foreign investment cause possible harm to national 
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then may recommend the State Council to make the final decision, along-
side the proposed mitigation measure, to either block the transaction or 
grant authorization.113 The last process is analogous to the presidential re-
view phase in the CFIUS process, and “[s]imilar to the black-box process of 
CFIUS, there is essentially no public information about the inner workings 
of the inter-ministerial committee.”114    
Most importantly, the multi-layer regulatory regime is susceptible to 
ministerial competition, due to ministries and local governments’ interest to 
bring in more foreign investment to stimulate the economy within their own 
jurisdiction. On the very top of the legislative food-chain, the NDRC and 
MOFCOM are known to be in fierce jurisdictional competition for jurisdic-
tion over foreign investment, dating back to before the national security re-
view as a regulatory regime.115 The two lead agencies system in the current 
security review regime may be a result of political bargaining and compro-
mise.116
 
Such competition of power is common in China’s legislative histo-
ry,117 and the State Council has allowed the “self-interested behaviors of the 
NDRC and MOFCOM by authorizing both of them to be lead agencies in 
the Joint Committee.”118  
The inter-ministerial competition gives foreign investors a chance to 
file their applications and reports with agencies that have the most favorable 
policies. This is especially prominent for the general review phase of the 
new foreign investment law. The approval authority for a transaction and 
the power to conduct a national security review lie in different branches of 
MOFCOM: the former with local MOFCOM and the latter central 
MOFCOM.119 Article 53 of the Draft Law gives local MOFCOMs the pow-
                                                                                                                                       
security, the applicant may propose to the department in charge of foreign investment under 
the State Council additional restrictive conditions for the foreign investment before a review 
decision is issued. The Joint Committee shall carry out an appraisal of the effectiveness and 
feasibility of such proposal. To eliminate possible harm to national security, the Joint Com-
mittee may, in accordance with the results of the appraisal, agree with the relevant parties to 
additional restrictive conditions, including necessary adjustments to the foreign invest-
ment”). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 295-96. 
 115 Xingxing Li, An Economic Analysis of Regulatory Overlap and Regulatory Competi-
tion: The Experience of Interagency Regulatory Competition in China’s Regulation of In-
bound Foreign Investment, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 685, 700-08 (2015). 
 116 Id. at 730-34. See also Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 301-02 (“[t]he outcome is the 
inefficient stacking of agencies; instead of being alternatives to each other, the NDRC and 
MOFCOM became additives to one another, each with veto power in signing off a foreign 
investment project. For the regulated firms, it means onerous sequential approvals rather 
than an option to choose a preferred regulatory agency”). 
 117 Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 302. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, at art. 53. 
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er to make judgments as to whether or not transactions are “covered trans-
actions” during their pre-approval screenings.120 As a result, the dominant 
strategy of foreign investors would attempt to file to local MOFCOMS ac-
cording to their decisions in the screening process, much like the forum 
shopping in the United States. This is because if the pre-approval power lies 
with local MOFCOM, a foreign investor would not be required to make a 
separate national security review filing with the central MOFCOM.121 For-
eign investors have an incentive to claim that they have received endorse-
ment from the authorities and therefore avoid self-reporting to the central 
MOFCOM.122 When local MOFCOM approves a foreign investment trans-
action, it does not trigger any national security concern.123 Since local 
MOFCOMs are making decisions for transacting parties as to whether a na-
tional security filing needs to be made, investors can rely on the decision 
and avoid voluntary fillings until local MOFCOM requires so.124  
The division of authorities may lie in the recognition of divergent in-
terests of local and central MOFCOMs: an incentive to encourage foreign 
investment during the early stage of China’s economic development. Na-
tional security can be put in lower priority compared with the need of eco-
nomic development. Local MOFCOMs align more with local governments, 
who have more interest to attract foreign investment into the locality.125 Lo-
cal governments and MOFCOMs are more “inclined to excessively focus 
on trivial details in a transaction so as to assert their authority and seek rents 
from the foreign investors.”126 It is also not in their interest to “turn down an 
incoming foreign investment project on the ground of a national security 
concern, as that implies steering foreign investment away from their locali-
ty.”127 As a result, Articles 52 and 53 provide foreign investors a de facto 
safe harbor by granting local MOFCOMs the authority to determine wheth-
er the application should even proceed to be review by the Joint Commit-
tee.128 Therefore, central MOFCOM has largely delegated its power of 
judgment to local MOFCOMs.129 
Last but not least, even if local MOFCOMs are able to take a neutral 
                                                          
 120 Id. at art. 53. 
 121 Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 306-07. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, at Art. 52, 53. Article 52 specifically allows investors to submit a 
request for appointment to confer about related procedural issues and have advance commu-
nications on the relevant circumstances before applying for national security review. 
 129 Xingxing Li, supra note 73, at 306-07. 
03. LIU - NEW CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:54 AM 
New Chinese Foreign Investment Law 
38:285 (2018) 
305 
stand on whether an individual transaction should be submitted to national 
security review, they may not have the capacity or information advantage to 
do so.130 Nor do local MOFCOM branches have the information advantage 
in making the decision for the transacting parties: “the local MOFCOM 
branches would make the judgment call as to whether the parties should 
make a filing prior to the revelation by the investors of comprehensive in-
formation about its national security implications.”131 The Draft Law has 
attempted to force more disclosure from the foreign investors regarding 
their financial and investment information, evidence in the quarterly and 
annual reporting requirement discussed before. The Draft Law also imposes 
more severe punishment for failure to disclose information during the regis-
tration and review process. In addition to the fine and confiscation of profit, 
it also (for the first time) imposes criminal liability for violating the foreign 
investment law.132 However, because foreign investors do not have to dis-
close their proprietary information about the possible national security im-
pacts of their transaction until they are about to enter the general review 
phase of security review, the punishment is unlikely to have a deterrence 
effect over investors’ filing practices.   
Overall, the processing of filing is convoluted due to the ministerial 
competition within the Chinese government and the divergent interests from 
different decision makers with regard to the initiation of the security review 
process. In addition, the capabilities of MOFCOM branches vary in China, 
and the review proceedings mitigate the effectiveness of the penalty set up 
in the Draft Law. As a result, one would expect great disparity in the deci-
sion-making process, a result that is open to forum shopping by foreign in-
vestors. 
                                                          
 130 Id. 
 131 Id.  
 132 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China, draft version to solicit 
opinions, supra note 44, at Draft Foreign Investment Law. For example, Article 144 poses a 
fine between RMB 100,000 and RMB 1 million (inclusive) or 10% of the illegal investment 
for a foreign investor who invests in a sector listed in the catalogue of prohibited investment. 
Article 145 imposes a fine between RMB 100,000 and RMB 1,000,000 (inclusive) or 10% of 
the illegal investment for investing in a sector listed in the catalogue of restricted investment 
without approval. Article 146 impose a fine of between RMB 100,000 and RMB 1,000,000 
(inclusive) or 10% of the investment, and a new national security review may be carried out 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 56 (Repeated National Security Review) of this 
law, when: (1) The foreign investor concealed the related circumstances, provided false ma-
terials or made false representations during the national security review; or (2) The foreign 
investor violated the additional restrictive condition(s) set out in a national security review 
decision. Article 148 imposes fix-term imprisonment of no more than one year or criminal 
detention for evading performance of its information reporting obligations, or by concealing 
the truth or by providing misleading or false information while carrying out information re-
porting. Article 151 threatens to revoke a business permit and impose criminal liability for 
violation of the foreign investment law. 
03. LIU - NEW CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2018  11:54 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:285 (2018) 
306 
V. CONCLUSION 
On 17 January 2017, the State Council released the Circular on Several 
Measures on Expanding the Opening to and Active Use of Foreign Invest-
ment Guidelines, which sets out the blueprint for China’s policies on at-
tracting foreign investment in the upcoming years.133 Although the Draft 
Law has yet to be officially approved by the central government, the Guide-
line document reiterates the plan to gradually implement the Draft Law in 
2017 as an effort to attract more foreign investment.134 China’s new foreign 
investment law intends to facilitate investments with a view to creating a 
stable, transparent and predictable investment environment, but negative list 
approach as well as the national security review process will subject foreign 
investors to a more restricted regulatory system. Under this new regulatory 
regime, the VIE structure used to gain access to the prohibited industries are 
likely to be entirely eliminated by the new foreign investment law and its 
reporting system, unless a special free-trade zone can be exempted from the 
foreign investment law. On the other hand, foreign investors in restricted 
categories are likely untouched by the adoption of the new law, due to the 
under-inclusive scope of the national security review process as well as the 
ministerial overlay of the reviewing system. Because of the current defect in 
the enforcement of the national security review, foreign investors in re-
stricted industries arguably benefit more from the strengthened regulatory 
regime as they are unlikely to be subject to national security review, and 
therefore will enjoy national treatment like domestic companies once they 
avoid security review. 
 
                                                          
 133 Circular on Several Measures on Expanding the Opening to and Active Use of For-
eign Investment Guidelines (国务院关于扩大对外开放积极利用外资若干措施的通知), 
State Council, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-01/17/content_5160624.htm (Jan. 
17, 2017). 
 134 Id. 
